

**SECRET**

Executive Registry

80-0225

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

22 JAN 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Pre-emptive Disclosure

On a number of occasions I have noted intelligence reports on Soviet and Cuban activities, which, if publicized, could serve to pre-empt, deter, or otherwise inhibit those activities. A most recent example is the reported [redacted]

[redacted] There is much in that report that might be used to publicize [redacted] subversive activities and thus serve to deter them, to the benefit of our own policies in Latin America.

I fully recognize that we must be careful not to compromise intelligence sources, but I also feel we have been far too passive in using advance information to our advantage. I believe we can correct this situation with a new SCC(I) policy statement accompanied by standard procedures for recommending, examining, and approving themes for exploitation on a national basis. Attached is a strawman of such a statement I would like to see tabled for consideration at an early SCC(I) meeting.

*Harold Brown*

Attachment

cc:

Secretary of State

Director of Central Intelligence

Review 7 January 1986

DIA and OSD review(s) completed.

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MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE  
(INTELLIGENCE)

SUBJECT: Policy on Pre-emptive Disclosure

It can be of advantage to the United States to use intelligence or other information to publicize actual or intended actions by foreign powers which might be detrimental to our interests. This is especially true where such disclosure might serve to pre-empt, deter, or discredit such actions. To insure appropriate consideration of such opportunities and to provide for the necessary protection of intelligence sources and methods, the following procedures will apply, effective immediately.

There shall be established an SCC(I) Disclosure Working Group chaired by the NSC Staff. The Working Group members will be representatives of the NSC Staff, Department of State, Department of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, supplemented on a case-by-case basis where required, by representatives of other SCC(I) members.

The SCC(I) Disclosure Working Group will meet as required to obtain and examine themes for exploitation submitted by Working Group members. Themes approved by the Working Group along with recommendations for implementation will be submitted to SCC(I) members, normally by memoranda, for review and final approval.

The Working Group will include recommendations for the manner and scope of such releases as well as the security considerations involved. The specific concurrence or dissent of the intelligence agency which originated the data involved also will be provided.

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**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)**  
Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	DD/RM				
4	DD/NFA				
5	DD/CT				
6	DD/A				
7	DD/O	X			
8	DD/S&T				
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/PA				
14	D/EEO				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18			X		
19	PB/NSC		X		
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SUSPENSE DATE: 25 January 1980

Remarks:

To 7: Please prepare DCI position for use in DCI meeting with SecDef on 28 Jan.

23 Jan 80